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Disentangling Religious, Ethnic and Gendered 
Contents in Boundary Work: How Young Adults 
Create the Figure of ‘The Oppressed Muslim Woman’ 
The binary opposition between ‘equal European women’ and ‘oppressed Muslim
women’ has become a powerful representation in Switzerland and throughout Europe.
Yet little is empirically known about the mechanisms through which actors in their
everyday lives (re)produce this prominent construction. In this mixed-method study
with young adults in a French-speaking Swiss Canton, we explore how and on behalf
of which markers they construct such a bright boundary against ‘the oppressed Muslim
woman’. We argue that the Swiss tradition of ethicising and culturalising migrant
issues is relevant for the construction of the boundary against Muslims in a way that
renders ethnicity salient. However, when it comes to the concrete markers of the
boundary – the ‘cultural stuff’ mobilised by the young people to mark the boundary –
the local highly secular context has the paradoxical effect that religious contents
become more salient than ethnicity. Normative ideas about ‘gender equality’, in
contrast, cross both ethnic and religious markers in the same way. We argue that
although ethnicity, religion and gender have commonalities in terms of categories of
identification and exclusion, they should be treated as different elements when it comes
to the social organisation of difference because each of them displays a specific logic.
Keywords: Boundary Work; Religion; Ethnicity; Gender; Gender Equality; Secularisa-
tion; Muslims; Switzerland; Multiculturalism; Transnationalism
Speaking about religious issues with regard to her future children, a student from an
upper secondary school in Neuchâtel, Switzerland, stated in an interview:
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which should be used for any reference to this work
I would like my children to be a bit Catholic, like me, or another similar religion,
but not Muslim […] I am not at all Muslim, and then, they would be proud of
wearing the headscarf. I see this as a negative aspect for women because they are
completely oppressed.
Another pupil stated:
I spent two weeks with Muslims and I saw that the girls spent time together during
classes but they had no other activities. They never went, for instance, to the
swimming pool. And then, they cannot do any sports, no fun activities, parties and
so on; they do nothing like this. So, yes, I think this is very different. I see this
related to the culture of Muslims.
The idea expressed in these quotations, which constructs gender subordination as 
integral to Islam and relates it to ‘culture’, has become a commonly accepted and 
powerful public and political narrative in recent years, and it has far-reaching 
consequences not only in Switzerland (among others Baghdadi 2010) but also in 
most European countries (i.e. for Norway: Razack 2004; for the Netherlands: 
Roggeband and Verloo 2007; and for the UK: Dustin and Phillips 2008). Govern-
ments, right-wing politicians, and some feminists have alleged a clash between 
accomplished ‘European gender equality’ and ‘Islamic backwardness or patriarchy’ 
provoked by immigrants or ethnic minorities. Unequal gender relations among 
migrant groups, and particularly among Muslims, are identified as the core problem 
of diversified societies. This binary construction between ‘us’ (Western champions of 
freedom and equality) and ‘them’ (Muslim Others as opponents to women’s rights) 
has put some feminists at the forefront of debates postulating an insurmountable 
tension between feminist values and multicultural ideas (most prominent is Moller 
Okin 1999).
These representations are a fundamental element of current efforts in various 
European countries to abandon multiculturalism as a policy goal, and they serve to 
introduce neo-assimilationist policies demanding individual integration efforts and 
an embrace of ‘national values’, i.e. gender equality (Kofman 2005). In the face of the 
power developed by these dichotomous figures, a vivid debate has evolved within 
academia, and feminist scholars have exhibited critical responses (Shachar 2007; Kiliç 
et al. 2008; Phillips 2010; Bilge and Scheibelhofer 2012). These scholars have 
demonstrated that the debates are stamped by over-simplified and essentialised 
conceptions of culture and religion: such perceptions hide non-cultural/religious and 
structural factors of gendered violence and inequalities, mask internal heterogeneity 
and dynamics as well as women’s agency, and presume that migrant/Muslim women 
are defined by a group-culture-based determinism.
How did this dichotomy come to be so powerful, and how is it socially (re)
produced in everyday life? In spite of various efforts to analyse these debates
critically, we still have almost no empirical studies that depict these processes in
detail. This article thus explores the mechanisms through which young non-Muslim
adults living in a French-speaking Swiss Canton create and nourish the image of the
‘imperiled Muslim women’ legitimising the boundary against Muslims in general.
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Our article aims to contribute to two academic debates. First, we aim to respond
with a specific case study to the discussion that is scrutinising these powerful
representations. We argue that although the main narratives might be similar in most
European countries, we can only understand the ‘rationale’ behind them by taking
into account the specific national and local contexts in which they occur and
embedding them historically and politically. Thus, we first examine how the general
Swiss context and the local context of Neuchâtel created historically boundaries
towards migrants, how those find concrete expression in policies towards migrants
and how in this environment young people create and mark the boundary against the
‘oppressed Muslim woman’.
Second, we contribute to the emerging body of work attempting at disentangling 
ethnic and religious contents in boundary work. The idea of boundary work has 
come to play a key role in important lines of scholarship throughout the social 
sciences, and it opens new theoretical insights into the organisation and production 
of social differences (Pachucki et al. 2007). Social differences and corresponding 
boundary processes emerge historically and are variable, thereby involving a broad 
range of actors (i.e. the nation-state, media, individuals, etc.). Much work has been 
done specifically on ethnic boundary work (i.e. Barth 1969; Jenkins 1997; Lamont and 
Molnar 2002), particularly in the context of migration (i.e. Bauböck 1998; Alba 2005; 
Bail 2008; Wimmer 2008, 2009). Characteristically, these studies operate with an 
inclusive concept of ethnicity: religious issues are included in the overarching 
category of ethnicity; or when ethnicity and religion are co-present, the specificity of 
religious elements is ignored. Hence, theoretically and empirically, the question of the 
relation between ethnicity and religion for boundary work has only marginally 
attracted the attention of scholars (exception i.e. Mitchell 2006) and should, as we 
argue in line with Ruane and Todd (2010: 4 –5), be further investigated. On a 
general level, ethnicity and religion are both modes of social organisation because 
they are common ways, in the terms of Brubaker (2012: 4), of identifying oneself 
and others, of constructing sameness and difference and situating and placing 
oneself in relation to others. There are, however, good reasons to separate the 
ethnic and religious contents of boundary work. An indiscriminate approach to 
ethnicity causes scholars to focus on the boundaries themselves rather than on the 
meaning and organisation of the boundaries or on the content of the ‘cultural 
stuff’ (Barth 1969: 15) used to mark boundaries. An inclusive concept of 
ethnicity cannot explain why ethnic markers are mobilised in some circumstances, 
while religious markers are mobilised in others, how they might be nested or why 
one or the other is prioritised. That is why we propose to focus on the content of 
the ‘cultural stuff’ that is mobilised for the closure of group boundaries to 
operate. Additionally, while the literature on boundary work has marginally 
taken into account the intersectional nature of boundary work, we suggest that 
there is a need to scrutinise the role of gender representations in boundary 
processes.
The first section outlines the methodology followed in the study. Afterwards, we
investigate the context of Switzerland and Neuchâtel and identify the ‘main
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narratives’ with regard to boundary making towards migrants and Muslims. Through
the case study, we then show how these dominant discourses are appropriated and
interpreted by young people in Neuchâtel and how arguments related to ethnicity,
religious practices and gender are used to mark the boundary against Muslims. In
conclusion, we argue that the Swiss tradition of ethnicising and culturalising migrant
issues is relevant to the construction of the boundary against Muslims in a way that
renders ethnicity salient. However, when it comes to the concrete content of the
boundary – the ‘cultural stuff’ mobilised by the young people to draw the boundary –
the locally highly secular context has the paradoxical effect that religion becomes
more salient than ethnicity. The normative idea of ‘gender equality’, in contrast,
crosses both ethnic and religious markers in the same way.
Methodology
We did not choose a specific religious or ethnic ‘community’ as the starting point 
for the enquiry, but selected instead a specific geographic locality – young people 
living in a Swiss Canton – in order to examine which ‘cultural stuff’ with 
corresponding boundaries is brought up by a variety of respondents. The canton of 
Neuchâtel has roughly 172,000 inhabitants and a long immigration history. For 
this reason Neuchâtel has today a highly diversified population: 23 per cent of the 
residents are foreigners representing 145 nationalities. Immigration has not only 
altered the ethno-national composition of the population but also led to religious 
diversity. Historically, Neuchâtel was Protestant, but immigrants arriving after the 
Second World War from southern Europe (Italy, Portugal and Spain) were mostly 
Catholic, unskilled workers engaged in the local watch industry, while those who 
immigrated after 1990 also included Muslims. In 2009, Catholics (36.7 per cent) 
outnumbered Protestants (36.6 per cent), while only a small part of the residents 
(3.7 per cent) was Muslim.1 The Muslims living in Neuchâtel come mainly from 
Kosovo, Bosnia and Turkey, while a smaller number comes from Tunisia or 
Algeria.
The research followed a mixed-methods approach (Creswell 2003). First, a 
telephone survey was conducted to detect the relevant categories of difference 
operating in boundary work. With this aim, we included questions measuring the 
social distance towards others, which we operationalised through items regarding 
marriage and partnership. Four hundred and four young adults between the ages of 16 
and 19 (out of 6,095 young people currently living in Neuchâtel) were surveyed.2 In 
order to be representative, a random sample of addresses was drawn from the 
Resident’s Registration Office, where all residents are registered. We then sought the 
corresponding telephone numbers in electronic directories. Our sample can be 
considered as good, since 79 per cent of the young adults were reached by telephone. 
The response rate was 63 per cent, which is high in comparison to other Swiss surveys 
(Cattacin et al. 2006).3 Data were analysed using SPSS. As we aim at measuring social 
distance from the eyes of the ‘majority’ youth, we concentrate
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here on the non-Muslim youth of the survey (379 out of 404 surveyed persons, see 
Table 1). They were mostly born in Switzerland (83 per cent), and a large share 
had Swiss citizenship (91 per cent; but there were also Italians, French, Portuguese 
and others). Those who had experienced immigration (17 per cent) were mainly 
members of the second generation (only 0.8 per cent were first-generation migrants).4
Second, we conducted ethnographic research over four months in four different 
classes with youngsters of the same age but with different ethnic and religious origins.5 
Interestingly, while in daily interactions, ethnic categories like ‘foreigner’, ‘migrant’, or 
gender (‘women and men’) appeared very often and were performa-tively used in 
order to challenge each other (Duemmler et al. 2010), religion as such was rarely 
discussed. Nonetheless, preliminary analysis of the quantitative survey pointed to the 
fact that religion was a relevant category for boundary work in spite of its absence in 
classrooms and in discussions during breaks or lunch time. Hence, we felt the need to 
understand this paradox in greater depth and to investigate this topic actively. That is 
why we conducted biographic and semi-structured interviews (36) with pupils and a 
focus group in each class (using some results of the quantitative survey as input) 
concentrating on religious and ethnic issues. The questions in the interviews aimed at 
understanding the role of religion and ethnicity in the daily life of the young people 
(family, friends, etc.), in their biographic experience, but also when it comes to the 
selection of love partners and the education of (future) children. In the focus groups, 
we specifically concentrated on the role of religion. Interviewees were chosen by 
balancing career path, age, ethnic background and peer-group belonging as well as 
according to their propensity to take part in the research. For the focus groups, all the 
students in each class were involved. Finally, we conducted semi-structured interviews 
with schoolteachers and principals.
For analysis, we first applied an open coding (with the help of Atlas.ti) of the
transcribed interviews and focus groups with the aim of identifying the most
important categories of difference. Although other categories of difference were
brought up by the young people (above all gender categories and ‘Swiss’ versus
‘foreigners’), the category ‘Muslim’ emerged as the strongest one, regularly opposed
to an ‘us’, in the survey as well as in the interviews and the focus groups. Two distinct
groups appeared out of the data, separated by a strong boundary, so that we can
speak about majority and minority youth. The majority group consists of all non-
Muslim young people, including Swiss nationals as well as first and second
generation migrants. The minority group concerns in this logic the Muslims,
whatever their nationality (Swiss or not) and place of birth.
During the subsequent axial and selective coding, we analysed the data in greater
depth in order to understand how the content of this boundary was marked by the
majority youth. The analysis presented below mirrors these results, and the
quotations used in the text are illustrative of the central codes.
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 Table 1 Sample.
Sample quantitative survey (n = 379)
Non-Muslim youth (majority youth)
Religion % n
Protestant 42.2 160
Catholic 32.5 123
No religion 19.8 75
Other religion 4.2 16
No answer 1.3 5
Total 100.0 379
Nationality
Swiss 90.5 343
Italian 9.2 35
French 6.6 25
Portuguese 5.8 22
Other EU-25/EFTA 2.6 10
Spain 1.8 7
Other former YU, SU and Europe 0.8 3
Latin America 1.6 6
Africa 0.5 2
Macedonia 0.3 1
Other 1.9 7
Total* 121.6 461
Nationality II
Swiss by birth 83.1 315
Naturalised Swiss 7.1 27
Other nationality, born in Switzerland 6.1 23
Other nationality, born abroad 3.7 14
Total 100.0 379
Immigration
No immigration 82.6 313
First generation 0.8 3
Second generation 16.6 63
Total 100.0 379
Self-rated religiosity
1 – not at all religious 40.6 154
2 23.5 89
3 19.5 74
4 9.0 34
5 – very religious 7.4 28
Total 100.0 379
Sample (ethnographic study) Interviews Focus groups
Upper secondary school 7 1
Commercial apprenticeship 16 1
Apprenticeship: telematicians and tinplates 9 1
Elementary vocational training 4 1
Total 36 4
*Double nationalities included.
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Ethnic and Religious Boundaries in a Specific Transnational, National and
Local Environment
Boundary work with regard to migration issues does not float in free space but is
embedded in political traditions and public narratives. Under conditions of both the
transnationalisation of social realities and the internal diversity and federalism of
Switzerland, the issue becomes complex: transnational, national and local-regional
public representations compose a potential pool from which the young can select in
order to draw the boundaries that lead to a specific construction of social reality.
Hence, it is necessary to sketch the main lines of these environments.
Switzerland stands internationally for a successful model of multiculturalism, at 
least when it comes to the cohabitation and political representation in the federal 
institutions of the four language groups – French, German, Italian and Rheto-Roman 
speakers. Indeed, linguistic and religious pluralism is the pillar of the self-image of 
Switzerland, a democratic and federal state (Helbling and Stojanovic 2011). Yet the 
development of a common and cohesive Helvetic identity, one that was able to 
embrace linguistic-local belonging and diversity, has had its price: as the formation of 
a ‘we’ always works by foreclosing alterities, exclusionary boundaries towards diverse 
‘others’ –  notably migrants called ‘foreigners’ –  were drawn based on 
essentialised and homogenised ideas of culture and ethnicity (Dahinden 2011). 
Historically, the myth of a small country that has to fight against ‘over-
foreignisation’ (Überfremdung) was especially relevant. This threat has accompanied 
most political debates and right-wing popular initiatives with regard to 
immigration and integration since the nineteenth century (Kury 2003; 
Niederberger 2004; Wicker 2009). The fuzziness of the term – it concerns the 
number of foreigners living in Switzerland but also the resulting ‘cultural and 
spiritual danger’ for Swiss identity (Arlettaz and Arlettaz 2004) – has rendered 
it adaptive and transferrable to different social groups. The ‘cultural others’ were 
first Jews or communists, after the Second World War Italian and Spanish labour 
migrants, since the 1980s labour migrants and asylum seekers from the former 
Yugoslavia and Turkey, and recently Muslims. The alleged danger of ‘over-
foreignisation’ became a main instrument in federal migrant-admission 
policies. The idea of the ‘cultural incompatibilities’ of certain migrants resulted in a 
kind of national-cultural sorting-out of who had the right to immigrate into 
Switzerland and who did not – thus establishing strong boundaries.6 At the same time, 
however, cultural assimilation was seen as the solution to the danger of ‘over-
foreignisation’ once migrants were living in Switzerland – an idea that remains 
influential to this day. Although multiculturalism as a policy goal regarding 
migrants – in terms of group rights – could never find fertile ground in Switzerland, 
the transnational circulation of multicultural ideas during the 1990s had an impact 
on Switzerland, which led to the political acceptance of the idea of enrichment 
through ethno-cultural differences and the right of migrants to live ‘their culture’ (in 
private).
The new transnational category of difference – ‘the culturally other Muslim’ –
could easily be adapted and included in these hegemonic public and political
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representations. Mainly since 9/11, Muslims – Switzerland being no exception – are 
perceived as a threat because of their ‘cultural difference’, and a stereotyping of 
Muslim actors can be observed, as can a ‘Muslimisation’ of immigrants (Behloul 
2005; Allenbach and Sökefeld 2010). ‘Muslims’ stand in this sustainable logic of 
boundary work along (negatively perceived) cultural lines for a new form of ‘over-
foreignisation’. It is now not only the ‘compatibility of the cultures’ of some migrant 
groups that is a stake, but additionally the compatibility of ‘cultural Islam’ (as is 
evident in the opening quotations). Swiss voters’ ban on the building of minarets in 
2009 is a prominent example of this discourse. Furthermore, unequal gender 
relations became the signifier for the new figure of ‘culturally different Muslims’. 
During the campaign for the above-mentioned vote, right-wing parties, but also 
centrist parties, defended the need for the emancipation of Muslim women – while 
normally opposing the feminist claims of Swiss women – and urged women, on these 
grounds, to accept the vote (Ettinger and Imhof 2011).
Yet Switzerland’s internal heterogeneity and federalism give nuances to these 
narratives circulating in the national space. With regard to the Canton of Neuchâtel, 
two issues are relevant. First, following Brubaker’s ( 1992) distinction between 
ethnic and civic citizenship models, it is arguable that in this French-speaking 
canton we find a civic idea of citizenship – in contrast to the ethno-cultural 
discourse of ‘over-foreignisation’ and the ethnic citizenship model on the national 
level – which leads to an interesting mixture of ethnic and civic ideas in 
cantonal migration policies. Second, Neuchâtel has a secular state-religion model, 
which complicates the question of religious issues, notably when it comes to Islam.7
The first article of the Constitution of Neuchâtel8 (of 24 September 2000) states 
that ‘The Canton of Neuchâtel is a democratic, secular and social republic and 
guarantees fundamental rights’. The Charte de la citoyenneté (2009)9, a document 
summarising the underlying principles of the Republic of Neuchâtel, which is sent to 
all newcomers in the canton, states:
This means that the Canton of Neuchâtel is a State that guarantees its citizens
fundamental freedoms and rights (a liberal State), […] a State in which there is no
official religion but where religious freedom is the rule (a secular State). […]
Foreign residents in Switzerland are subject to the same legal framework as Swiss
citizens. However, if they come from other cultures, they have no legal obligation
to adapt to the Swiss lifestyle […]. [O]nly tolerance and open-mindedness can
ensure the balance within mixed communities.
This quotation demonstrates Neuchâtel’s civic attitude towards citizenship. This civic
orientation is further emphasised by the fact that Neuchâtel gives foreigners, as only
5 of Switzerland’s 26 cantons do, the right to vote and to be elected at the communal
and cantonal levels (which is not possible on the national level, where the ethno-
national ius sanguinis model holds sway). Despite this civic orientation, ‘culture’
remains important, as can be seen in the constitutional text as well as in the Charte
de la citoyenneté: it is essentialised, but positively loaded; a tolerance towards the
‘culturally other’ is demanded. Still, this idea of ‘culture’ represents a weak form of
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multiculturalism, as it addresses only lifestyle and not group rights. In other words,
this articulation of ethno-cultural and civic ideas results in the demand for an open-
mindedness towards (essentialised) cultural differences, which is combined with the
civic and universal idea that all human beings have the same rights and duties (like
political participation).
Additionally, Neuchâtel is a secular republic and one of only two cantons in
Switzerland with a strict separation of state and church. This laïcité means religious
freedom, but it also leaves no space for the recognition of religious communities:
religion has to be private, and it must be lived outside the public sphere. In this
model, religious freedom is more important than in the French version of laïcité,
where the state aims to ban religion from the public sphere. By virtue of this liberty, a
commune in Neuchâtel cannot forbid Muslim pupils from wearing headscarves in
class. But it can forbid teachers from doing so, because teachers’ display of religious
markers contradicts the principle of non-denomination in public schools (see Charte
de la citoyenneté). The secular orientation is of high relevance for public institutions
like schools, as they are legally bound to be religiously blind, an ideology that is taken
very seriously, as the interviews with school teachers and principals reveal. To the
question of whether religious diversity was an informally discussed topic at school
among the teachers, the principal of a vocational school answered:
We had three or four requests from believing and active Muslims who asked to be
excused from school to celebrate the end of Ramadan. We accorded them this
leave, but not on religious grounds. We allowed them to participate in a cultural
activity. We wanted to avoid putting our fingers in something – like religion – that
we will not be able to control in the long run. That’s why we asked these persons to
re-write their request and to argue for the leave with a cultural issue instead of a
religious one.
‘Culture’ is tolerated as an argument in schools for special treatment, while religion
has to be strictly excluded from this public institution. In other terms, exercising
religious freedom is possible in this secular environment, but only if disguised as
‘cultural activity’ and not labelled as religious.
Hence, the question arises as to whether and how, in this context, ethno-cultural
and religious ideas underlie these young people’s boundary work, that builds on this
idea of the ‘oppressed Muslim women’.
The Young People’s Boundary Work
‘Positive Culture’ versus ‘Negative Religion’ as an Engine for Boundary Work
An important result from the interviews is that the young adults living in Neuchâtel
have imbibed the dominant local discourse of open-mindedness towards (essentia-
lised) ethno-cultural difference – but in a selective way. At first glance, many
interview partners not only harboured a strong tolerance towards ethno-cultural
diversity, which they considered enriching, but also forcefully condemned and
opposed racist discourse and actions by mobilising civic ideas. This student’s
9
quotation is demonstrative of the statements made by many interview partners:
‘I think you will not go very far if you are closed-minded and if you are not open
towards other cultures. I think other cultures are very enriching’ (woman, Swiss,
Catholic, commercial apprentice). Nonetheless, the young people, participants of this
study, hold this positive view of cultural difference only in regards to certain
nationalities, and as soon as religious differences are at stake, this discursive open-
mindedness is weakened.
In the quantitative survey, the relative importance of religion as a boundary marker 
compared to ethnic and racial criteria can be seen (Figure 1). Young people were asked 
how important it is for them that their spouse be of the same skin colour, ethnic origin 
and religion. The response had to be on a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 5 (very 
important). The following graph shows the mean values of the majority youth (n = 
379) and the (positive) standard deviations. It makes clear that although none of the 
three criteria are of extreme importance to the majority youth, religion is significantly 
more salient (mean = 2.0) than ethnic origin (mean = 1.7) and skin colour (mean = 
1.6; both t test <0.001). The means are distinguished further between the various 
religious affiliations of the majority youth but the statistical analysis (ordinal 
regression) shows no significant difference in this specific pattern. The higher the 
young people rate their own religiosity, however, the more important is it for them 
that their future partners have the same ethnicity and the same religion (χ2 < 0.001, 
Pearson 0.218 resp. 0.431). With regard to sex, age, education, nationality or 
geographical origin within the canton, the young people surveyed do not significantly 
differ in this judgement.
Data from the qualitative interviews allow us to better grasp the processes through
which Muslims become the negative ‘others’ for the youths in the schools under
study. The following quotation is representative of this tendency. During the
1
2
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4
5
criterion: same religion criterion: same ethnic origin criterion: same skin color
majority youth (mean)
Standard deviation (+)
majority youth having no religion (mean)
majority youth being Protestant (mean)
majority youth being Catholic (mean)
majority youth with other religion (mainly christian) (mean)
Figure 1 Boundary work through partnership selection: signiﬁcance of religion, ethnic
origin and skin colour (1 ‘unimportant’ to 5 ‘very important’).
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interview, the respondent (male, Swiss and French, non-believing Protestant and
tinplate apprentice) first reproduced positive evaluations of ethno-cultural differ-
ences. The interviewer further asked: ‘Is it important for you that your girlfriend is of
the same nationality as you?’ The young man answered: ‘No, because for me, my
girlfriend could be of any nationality, she could be Japanese, Chinese, Congolese or
American; it does not matter at all as long as I have a good feeling and I really love
her’. Later on, as religion became the topic under discussion, the young man
mentioned the possibility that his future wife could be Muslim. The interviewer
asked: ‘Let’s imagine that your wife was Muslim and that this would be important for
her. Could you imagine your children being Muslim?’ The young man replied:
Them being Muslim, yes, but them practicing, certainly not. They could be
baptized as Muslim, so that when they communicate their religion, they would say,
‘I am Muslim’. But I do not think that I could accept it if they practiced [their
religion], because really, Muslims are quite extreme. That’s what I see, what I hear
and what I know from people I meet. This religion is very extreme. There is no
pork, there are no birthdays, and all this is really just too extreme for me.
This quotation illuminates the ambivalent ideas towards difference that shape youths’
discourses. While cultural difference (‘being’ Muslim) is not a problem in this young
man’s account, the practice of this ‘extreme’ religion and the constraints it imposes
becomes insurmountable obstacles.
Moreover, the data from the quantitative survey give more evidence that it is, 
above all, Islam that young people find problematic and which they cannot relate to 
cultural enrichment. We asked the young people in the survey what they think about 
their brother or sister getting married to different types of persons (a Swiss, foreigner, 
Italian, Black, Jew, Tamil, Turk, Kosovar, or Muslim). The following graph illustrates 
the nature of the responses (Figure 2): a clear social hierarchy of Swiss people on the 
top, followed by Italians, foreigners in general and blacks. Muslims, in contrast, are 
the least favoured in that they appear at the bottom of this hierarchy (all t test <0.001 
compared to the other types of persons). They are the out-group par excellence and 
excluded from potential familial linkage. It is not surprising that nationalities 
connected mainly to Islam are also positioned at the bottom (Turks, Kosovars). 
Interestingly, those without a religion are significantly more likely to approve of 
marriage with a Muslim, whereas young Protestants disapprove of such a marriage 
the most [mean values (SD) 2.4 (0.82) vs. 2.7 (0.60), ANOVA < 0.001, η = 0.221]. 
The influence of religious affiliation among the majority youth remained significant 
even when controlled for self-declared religiosity, which was overall not significant 
here.10
In sum, religion plays a more important role than ethnicity or race as a boundary
marker in terms of partnership relations, and it is also a category that brings the
positive open-mindedness of these young people towards ‘cultural others’ to an end
when the religion in question is Islam. The young people replicate the locally
anchored idea of ‘positive cultural difference’ when it comes to immigrants without
Muslim backgrounds – but they apply the problematic aspects of cultural difference,
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in the tradition of ‘over-foreignisation’, to Muslims. This also makes it clear that in a
secular environment, religious issues are not ‘out-dated’. On the contrary, aligning
religion morally to the private realm has the effect of developing it into as a category
of exclusion, as will be shown next.
Three-pronged Religiously Coloured ‘Cultural Stuff’: Marking the Boundary
From the present analysis of the qualitative interview data, one finds that the 
boundary against Muslims is marked along three axes. These axes are linked to ideas 
about religious practices, and they are intertwined with normative ideas about a 
‘good’ religion. The representation of gender equality/inequality is articulated with 
these religious arguments and crosses the three axes – pointing to the intersectional 
(Crenshaw 1994; Anthias 2002) and simultaneous construction of the boundary 
through gendered and religious ‘cultural stuff’. By loading the social categorisation 
with moral connotations, these young people position the two constructed groups in 
a hierarchy: the in-group is considered morally superior, and the ‘others’ are morally 
devalued. The degree to which most of the young people of the majority participated 
in constructing this bright boundary was surprising. There were some exceptions, 
concretely some attempts to blur the boundary (i.e. through universalising strategies 
like ‘gender inequality’ as a human rights issue). Such counter-discourses were, 
however, rare, and we will focus our analysis on the mechanisms (re)producing this 
bright boundary.
The first normative idea used to create the boundary is autonomy and freedom
with regard to religious issues. In the young people’s view, religious convictions must
be voluntary, optional and subject to personal choice, and it must be possible to live
those convictions in an individualised manner. Christianity, according to the
interviewees, guarantees these choices; Islam, in contrast, is linked to constraints
and limitations of personal freedom, and one has to follow the strict rules of the
1
2
3
4
5
Swiss Italian Foreigner Black person Jew Tamil Turk Kosovar Muslim
majority youth (means) Standard deviation (-)
Figure 2 Boundary work as social distance: attitudes towards sisters’ or brothers’
marriage (1 ‘I do not agree’ to 5 ‘I do agree’).
12
Koran without being able to individualise the practices. These young people thus 
place Muslims on the ‘wrong’ side of the boundary, presuming that strict rules and 
constraints are responsible for their submission, in particular when it comes to 
women. The personal sacrifices associated with Islam are connected most notably to 
the question of the headscarf or in general to the inferior position of women. The 
following student’s reaction to this issue during an interview is representative for 
many youngsters: ‘For example, consider those women who have to wear a headscarf. 
I can tell that they do so only to please somebody. In Christianity, nobody is obliged 
to do something they do not want to do’ (woman, Swiss and French, Protestant, 
commercial apprentice). Particularly interesting here is the normative idea of the 
individualisation of religious practices. Social scientists observe that religious practice 
in Western societies has undergone a fundamental transformation insofar as it is no 
longer the consequence of prescription, but of choice and ‘bricolage’ (Dobbelaere 
1999; Stolz and Baumann 2007). Such forms of religiosity are, as the interviews 
demonstrate, quite typical for these young people. What is surprising, however, is 
that they do not only live this kind of individualised religion, but that beyond that, 
they develop a moral idea that only such kind of religious behaviour is, normatively 
speaking, ‘good’. In this way, they place Muslims once more on the other side of the 
boundary, presuming that strict rules and constraints are against this norm.
Something similar occurs with regard to the second set of ‘cultural stuff’ used as a 
boundary marker, which we label secularisation in terms of a diminishment of the 
societal and institutional significance of religion and its privatisation (Luckmann 
1976; for a critics on secularisation theory see Casanova 1994; Berger 1999). 
Secularisation is not only established as an important value in Neuchâtel and 
notably in its schools, but also positively valued by the young adults who do not deny 
that religion might be important in the personal sphere. Secularisation thus gains the 
status of a ‘moral trust’ in the eyes of these young people. Religion should be lived 
outside the public realm, not be linked to public institutions and not be spoken about 
or publicly shown. Many students mentioned that they found it strange to speak in 
public about this issue in a focus group, given that religion must remain in the 
private realm. One student mentioned during the interview that speaking about her 
religious beliefs in school was a kind of ‘coming out’. Hence, all possible ways of 
living one’s religion that are not invisible in the public sphere are morally 
depreciated. Minarets, for instance, are for these young people public markers of 
deference, and the headscarf in particular is interpreted as a visible and public sign of 
religion, violating this imperative of secularisation. One quotation illustrates this 
point quite well: ‘I think that Catholics and Protestants [practice] a religion that is 
not very demonstrative; for instance, we do not have a headscarf, or other things, and 
this is different from other religions’ (woman, Swiss and French, Protestant, 
commercial apprentice). It is obvious here that these young people have incorporated 
the local ideology of laïcité.
The third normative idea mobilised for boundary work is related to the
dichotomisation between what the young adults call ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’
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practices. The latter are in the first place attributed to Islam, but also in general to all
persons who live their religiosity ‘extremely’. One apprentice, when asked whether he
could live with somebody for whom religion is important, replied: ‘Yes, but not in
excess: this means when it comes to banning certain things. If it does not disturb,
then it is OK’ (man, Swiss, Protestant and telematics apprentice). As the earlier
quotation about Muslims’ ‘extreme’ character supposedly prohibiting pork and
birthdays made clear, the arguments are anchored in a discourse that relates Islam to
fundamentalism. Further, in the interviews, Islam is also related to constraint and
loss of autonomy, as well as religious wars and religiously motivated conflicts. And
again, this extremism is articulated by projecting the position of Muslim women as
oppressed (see the quotation at the beginning of the article).
This three-pronged ‘cultural stuff’ that is mobilised by these young people leads to 
a ‘bright’ boundary (Alba 2005) between established ‘egalitarian’ Christians and 
outsider ‘unequal’ Muslims, and it has important consequences.
First, when it comes to the intersection of religious and gendered boundary 
markers, a construction of the ‘non-egalitarian other’ occurs. Furthermore, the 
majority youth perform a communalisation by mobilising the idea that their ‘own’ 
women – in the Christian tradition – can live religion the way they wish, in 
freedom, privately, in an individualised manner, and while enjoying equality with 
men. What is striking with regard to these normative assumptions is that they do 
not necessarily reflect the ‘real’ behaviour of the members of the in-group or of the 
out-group, and that the young people mobilise the idea of ‘group-determinism’ 
homogenising hereby the two ‘groups’. Gender equality in Switzerland is far from 
being a fact. Actual data concerning the differences in salaries and occupations 
between Swiss men and women give a clear message.11 And vice versa, obviously, 
gender inequality is not valid for all Muslims living in Switzerland, and the Muslims 
have the same diversified attitude towards religion as other people (Schneuwly 
Purdie et al. 2009).
Second, these boundary markers are linked to the established political tradition of
‘over-foreignisation’ with its idea of ‘culture-led group determinism’ and to
assimilationist pressure as a means of fighting ‘cultural differences’. Hence, ‘culture’
and Islam are fused together, and on this ground, strong assimilationist demands are
formulated. This statement by a commercial apprentice (woman, Swiss, Protestant)
highlights this tendency well:
I think everybody has a culture, people have a way of living that comes from their
culture. When they come to live here I can understand that they want to maintain
this memory. But I think they should do it at home, pray around their tables in
their own languages, OK. […] And the fact that they now want to build minarets is
in my eyes out of question because these are things that are not in our culture. And
I think it is important that they integrate […]. They should be grateful that we
accept them, and then they just continue to behave as if they were in their home
country. For instance, when a woman wears a headscarf […] they come here and
then the woman continues to be oppressed and to wear the headscarf.
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However – and this is the third point – the importance of the local context is
revealed, in that the narratives are often more nuanced and (partially unconsciously)
differentiated. In particular, religious individuals are not seen as problematic as long
as they conform to the normative ideas described above, even when they are Muslim.
Thus, these young people are not ‘against’ religion as such, but they construct an
ideal of a ‘good religion’ – mostly incorporated in Christianity – for which they show
tolerance. The following quotation illustrates this point well. A student stated in her
interview that for her, the headscarf symbolised the oppression of women, but she
continued:
This doesn’t mean that I will not speak to women wearing a headscarf. Last year,
there was this girl who was thinking about starting to wear the headscarf but she
hesitated, and I found her quite nice. So, if she had put it on, I would not have said:
‘Oh, she is even more oppressed than I thought, but simply… she is proud to wear
it’. So, if you’re not obliged to put on a headscarf, it does not annoy me. But if you
are forced, then I am annoyed… If it is a personal choice, I can understand it,
because it is a religion and in fact I understand that a person is proud of her
religion. (Woman, Swiss, Catholic, upper secondary school student)
Here again, next to the transnational discourse on the ‘oppressed Muslim women’,
the locally anchored ideas of religious freedom and civic attitude of openness towards
difference appear, as long as practices do not fail to comply with normative ideas
about what a ‘good religion’ is.
Conclusion
The idea of ‘non-egalitarian Muslims’ as it is discursively constructed by the young
people can be understood according to the historical local, national and transnational
context and is explained by different intertwined mechanisms, each displaying its
own logic. Ethnic as well as religious and gendered elements are salient for the
construction of the boundary, and it is now possible to disentangle the different
dimensions.
First, the ethnic contents in this ‘bright’ boundary are visible and linked to the
long-lasting Swiss political tradition of fighting against ‘over-foreignisation’. The
ethnically coloured representation of an assumed danger of ‘essentially culturally
different foreigners’ could easily be transferred to Islam once this new category of
difference was transnationalised. Hence, an originally ethnic element was transferred
to and imposed upon a religious category, once this category was circulating in
transnational space. Islam is here, in this ethnic logic, fused with the idea of a
‘culture-led group determinism’ and ‘cultural incompatibility’. But ethnicity is also
salient in another way: these young people replicate the idea of enrichment through
cultural diversity, but they do so selectively, and more rarely and with more
ambiguity when it comes to immigrants with a Muslim background. Finally, the
established idea of ‘over-foreignisation’ has important consequences, as it simulta-
neously leads to strong cultural assimilationist pressures on migrants and, once the
ethnic content transferred on the category of Islam, also on Muslims.
15
Second, religious contents in boundary making are related to the specific
secular context of Neuchâtel. Autonomy, privacy, individualisation, secularisation
and moderate practice are the ‘cultural stuff’ with which boundaries are marked,
and these elements are morally loaded, leading to the construction of ‘good’
versus ‘bad’ religion. Hence, secularisation does not, as one would expect,
attenuate religious issues, but brings them to the forefront of symbolic boundary
work and the construction of the ‘non-egalitarian Muslim other’. These young
people have not only incorporated the idea of laïcité into their own lives but also
they use it as an indicator for positively valued behaviour. Secularised young
people use specific religious markers in order to create a ‘bright’ boundary against
other groups, identifying them in religious categories. This practice explains why,
in this specific context, religion is more salient than ethnicity, as shown by the
quantitative data.
Third, gender representations are mobilised to categorise these Muslim ‘others’, in
a similar way as in other European countries. The ‘oppression of Muslim women’ is a
topic that crosses the three axes, and the boundary between ‘Christians’ and
‘Muslims’ is drawn specifically from the viewpoint of gender equality. A normative
hierarchy is thus constructed between the supposedly egalitarian gender relations of
the dominant population and the non-egalitarian gender relations of Muslims.
In sum, we might conclude that the figure of the ‘non-egalitarian Muslims’ is the
result of the mobilisation of three nested categories of difference. First, when it comes
to ideas of groups, these young people rely on ethnicity in the sense of ‘culture-led
group determinism’ and assimilationist ideas – in the tradition of ‘over-foreign-
ization’. Second, the ‘cultural stuff’ with which they mark the boundary has a
religious content. And third, gender equality/inequality is intersectionally added to
mark the ethnic and religious contents of the boundary.
This example shows that it is important to treat ethnicity, religion and gender –
although they have commonalities in terms of categories of identification and
exclusion – as different elements in boundary work, each one with its specific logic,
and each one nourished from different historically established public local, national
or transnationalised narratives. Religion is not just an element of ethnicity: It
develops its own logic, arguments and boundary contents. To bundle ethnicity and
religion together is to fail to recognise the distinct character each brings to symbolic
distinction and to processes of exclusion and inclusion.
The example discussed here points to another specificity: it seems striking that in
Switzerland apparently a specific form of anti-Islamism developed, one which is
nourished by ethnic, religious and gender elements and which has a specific logic.
When it comes to the social organisation of difference as performed by the young
people, ‘traditional racism’ did not play a role, as, maybe surprisingly, race was
definitely not a category mobilised by the young people when it came to boundary
work nor was it was a category relevant for social distance. This result, valid for our
sample, deserves without doubt further investigation in the future.
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Notes
[1] Population census 2009, Federal Statistical Office. Available from: http://www.ne.ch/neat/
site/jsp/rubrique/rubrique.jsp?StyleType=bleu&DocId=33063
[2] This is an appropriate sample size if we accept a confidence interval of 95 per cent.
[3] Since there was no sample bias with regard to geographical spread within the canton, sex
and age of the respondents, we did not weight the data.
[4] Following the official Swiss statistics classification, we define second generation migrants as
persons who have spent more than 5 years in Swiss schools (born in Switzerland or born
abroad).
[5] Switzerland has a dual-track educational system, and our work spanned both tracks. It is a
specificity of the Swiss educational system that only 20 per cent of young people are
enrolled in upper secondary school – in Neuchâtel, 26 per cent of young people were
enrolled in 2010 – meaning that most young people do an apprenticeship instead.
[6] In 1914, ‘over-foreignisation’ was for the first time mentioned in an official document. In
the Federal Law on Residence and Establishment of Foreigners, in force between 1931 and
2004, the authorities had to consider in their decisions the country’s moral and economic 
interests and the degree of ‘over-foreignisation’ (ANAG, Art. 16/Linea 1). In 1991, the 
concept was translated into Swiss admission policy as ‘cultural distance’ in the so-called 
three-circle model. Persons from the first and the second circles – EU/EFTA and USA/
Canada – were seen as culturally similar and as able to assimilate, while those from the 
third circle (‘third-country-nationals’) were seen as ‘culturally too distant’ and hence could 
no longer be admitted for work in Switzerland. In the current federal law regarding 
foreigners, dating from 2005, two circles remained: free circulation with the EU and no 
immigration from other countries, with exception of highly qualified persons (Niederberger 2004).
[7] Because Switzerland is a federation composed of 26 cantons, the relationship between state
and religion is institutionalised in 26 different ways.
[8] Constitution de la République et Canton de Neuchâtel, available from: http://www.admin.
ch/ch/f/rs/1/131.233.fr.pdf
[9] http://www.ne.ch/neat/site/jsp/rubrique/rubrique.jsp?StyleType=bleu&DocId=29625
[10] Other variables (age, education, nationality and geographical origin within the canton)
showed no significant influence in an ordinal regression with the dependent variable ‘sister/
brother marries a Muslim’.
[11] For actual data about differences in salaries and occupations, see Federal Office for Gender
Equality (FOGE), available from: http://www.ebg.admin.ch/themen/00008/index.html?lan 
g=en (accessed 28 March 2014).
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